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The global trend for contracting out the supply of military and security 
services is growing. Security is being transformed from a service 
for the public or common good into a privately provided service. 
The present paper by Nikolaos Tzifakis argues that the implications 
of outsourcing security services to private agencies are not a 
priori positive or negative; proper regulation of private military and 
security services is important. The author recommends that states 
should determine their ‘inherently governmental functions’ and keep 
these functions out of the market’s reach. States should attempt to 
mitigate some of the shortcomings in the operation of the private 
market for security services by preventing supply from determining 
its own demand. States need to avoid contracting out services to 
corporations that enjoy a monopoly in the market. Instead, they 
should open competitive bids for all private security contracts.
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Executive Summary
Today, the global trend for contracting out the supply of 
military and security services is steadily growing. Security is 
being transformed from a service for the public or common 
good into a privately provided service. The largest private 
companies in the field have developed more advanced 
know-how and greater material and human resources than 
the security agencies and armies of many sovereign states. 
In this respect, several analysts have made observations on 
the restructuring of public–private relations in the domain 
of security. They note that what is actually taking place is 
a broader shift from vertical, centralised government to 
horizontal, fragmented security governance. 
The implications of outsourcing security services to private 
agencies are not a priori positive or negative. Ultimately, 
everything boils down to the way public and private actors 
deal with the questions of ‘when’ and ‘how’ to go about 
contracting out security services. 
With regard to the ‘when’, states should determine their 
‘inherently governmental functions’ and keep these 
functions out of the market’s reach. They should also 
entrench their independent decision-making capacity 
in order to select the most appropriate solutions to deal 
with their security issues. More importantly, states should 
continue to struggle to protect the safety of their people, 
irrespective of the latter’s ability to purchase security 
services in the market. A combination of public and private 
security would not necessarily be detrimental to the 
public interest if states stopped retracting resources and 
operational objectives in response to the expansion of the 
private security supply.
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With respect to the ‘how’, states should attempt to mitigate 
some of the shortcomings in the operation of the private 
market for security services by taking the following steps:
•	 preventing supply from determining its own demand;
•	 launching competitive bids for every single contract and 
striving to obtain several offers; 
•	 refraining from awarding cost-plus contracts for services 
whose outsourcing is primarily intended to increase cost 
efficiency; 
•	 avoiding contracting out services to corporations that 
enjoy a monopoly in the market; 
•	 paying greater attention to post-award contract 
management by substantially increasing the capacity and 
authority of oversight institutions;  
•	 avoiding transferring contract supervision to private 
agencies; and 
•	 calculating the cost of contract management when 
considering the option of outsourcing services. 
Moreover, states should increase the accountability of 
the global private security industry by taking the following 
measures:
•	 effectively regulating the activity and the operation 
of private military and security companies at both 
the national and international levels, in line with the 
recommendations of the UN Working Group on the Use 
of Mercenaries;
•	 reversing the climate of general impunity that prevails in 
several locations where the private security sector thrives 
(for instance, in post-conflict countries);
•	 explicitly stipulating the responsibility of prime 
contractors for subcontractor activities;
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•	 demonstrating zero-tolerance concerning serious cases 
of misconduct involving corporations or individual 
contractors; and
•	 excluding, or altogether eliminating, recurrently and 
seriously negligent or unscrupulous corporations (and 
their affiliates) from future contracts.
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Introduction 
The private security service sector has experienced 
spectacular growth since the end of the Cold War. The 
steady increase of the industry’s global turnover was 
maintained even during the international financial crisis 
(2008–9) due to the impressive expansion of the market 
for this type of service in emerging economies. The global 
security service market was worth $138.6 billion in 2007 and 
was estimated at $152.5 billion in 2009 (Freedonia 2008, 6; 
2011, 5). The future of the sector looks very bright despite 
the decision of the United States Department of Defense 
(2010, 55) to gradually reduce its reliance on support service 
contractors to pre-9/11 levels. According to Freedonia 
(2011, 4), the global market for private security services will 
continue to grow at 7.4% annually, reaching $218.4 billion in 
2014. Much of the sector’s growth will be stimulated in the 
leading emerging economies where it is projected that the 
turnover will increase at double-digit rates.
Typologies and Classifications
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) form 
a very diverse sector. In terms of activities, this sector 
comprises private agencies performing a great variety 
of tasks ranging from supporting combat operations 
to language interpretation. The most common analytic 
division is between private security companies (PSCs) 
and private military companies (PMCs) (Brooks 2000, 129; 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 239). In many respects, this 
analytical scheme reproduces and mirrors the division of 
state security services between the police and the military. 
The first category, PSCs, specialises in the provision of 
protection services for assets and/or people. Their clients 
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mainly include international organisations, multinational 
corporations, non-governmental organisations, small and 
medium-size enterprises, and individuals. The second 
category, PMCs, comprises the firms that participate 
in actions such as military operations, stabilisation and 
post-conflict reconstruction, and security sector reform. 
In recent years PMCs have been increasingly contracted 
by states and international organisations to perform tasks 
such as training, restructuring and modernising armies 
and police forces; gathering and analysing intelligence; 
securing military communications; operating technologically 
advanced military systems; providing military transportation 
and protecting strategic targets; clearing minefields; and 
interrogating prisoners. Considering the broad range of 
roles that PMCs may perform, several analysts propose 
a further analytical subdivision of them based on the 
extent of their involvement in military operations (see 
figure 1). For instance, Singer (2001/02, 201) distinguishes 
between military provider firms, military consulting firms 
and military support firms. Military provider firms engage 
‘in actual fighting or direct command and control of field 
units, or both’. Military consulting firms offer advice and 
training services, providing ‘strategic, operational, and 
organizational analysis’. Singer explains that the critical 
difference between these two types of firms is the ‘trigger 
finger’ factor, that is to say, whether they directly engage in 
combat. Finally, military support firms provide ‘rear-echelon 
and supplementary services’, filling functional needs such 
as logistics, technical support and transportation (201–2). 
Obviously, if military provider firms occupy one end of a 
continuum of PMCs based analytically on their lethality, the 
other end would include corporations specialised in such 
tasks as the distribution of development assistance and 
logistical support.
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Figure 1 A Typology of PMSCs in Terms of services
 
The sector of private security service providers is also 
very diverse in terms of size. It encompasses both local, 
small-sized enterprises and multinational giants listed on 
international stock exchanges. Among the PSCs, G4S, 
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120 countries and has more than 625,000 employees 
(G4S n.d.b). It proudly claims to be the second-largest 
private employer in the world (G4S n.d.a). G4S had annual 
revenues of £3 billion in 2004; the rapid growth of its 
operations during the following years led to an increase in 
its yearly turnover to £7.4 billion in 2010 (Hemscott Group 
n.d.). Securitas, the second-largest PSC in the world, 
operates in 45 countries and employs more than 280,000 
people (Securitas n.d.). Securitas offset the slowdown 
of its operations in North America in 2008–9 (due to the 
economic recession) by consolidating its position in 
other regions. In 2009–10, Securitas (2010, 49; 2011, 
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Overall, the PSC sector has become so important that in 
states as different as the US, the UK, India and Bulgaria, the 
number of PSC contractors is much greater than the number 
of employees in the respective state security agencies 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 2). 
In the case of PMCs, MPRI, a subsidiary of L-3 
Communications specialising in the provision of military 
training services, operates offices in 40 locations in the US 
and in several countries around the world (MPRI n.d.a). 
MPRI officials have in the past boasted about the fact that 
their company could muster more (retired) generals than the 
American army actually has in its service (Leander 2005a, 
609). And DynCorp International, to name another PMC, 
has offered a large variety of services including logistics 
and contingency support; guarding operations; and the 
recruitment, training and deployment of more than 6,000 
peacekeepers and trainers to 11 different countries. In 
2010, DynCorp International registered revenues worth $3.4 
billion. This was impressive growth of 32.2% in comparison 
with 2009 and was largely due to increased contingency 
operations and higher demand for secure aviation transport 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (DynCorp International 2011, 3). To 
grasp the impact of PMCs, it is worth mentioning that during 
the 1990s, American PMCs alone trained armies in more 
than 42 countries around the world (Avant 2002, 1).  
The tendency of large PMSCs to hand over the 
implementation of contracts to subcontractors provides for 
an additional differentiation of corporations with respect to 
their position in the ‘contract chain’. As McCoy (2010, 677–
8) explains, the US administration awards large contracts 
for services to be provided in Iraq and Afghanistan to major 
American companies, called ‘prime contractors’ or ‘primes’. 
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These companies forward the contracts to US-based 
subsidiaries or to international affiliates, frequently based in 
the Middle East. The latter usually subcontract companies 
in recruiting countries such as India and the Philippines. 
And the actual execution of the contract is sometimes 
carried out by another tier of subcontracted companies 
that is based in the location of deployment. Given that the 
primes do not commonly face any restriction concerning the 
number and tiers of their subcontractors, the contract chain 
can sometimes look much more complex (e.g. five tiers of 
subcontractors) (Cha 2004, A01). The extent to which large 
corporations work through subcontractors is apparent from 
the fact that 29 of the top defence contractors (i.e. including 
the major defence companies in 2008) in the United States 
had at least 1,194 offshore subsidiaries (United States 
General Accounting Office 2010a, 5). 
Owing to the globalisation of the market for the supply 
of security services and the heterogeneity of the industry 
in terms of function, size and role, states may engage in 
different types of relationships with PMSCs. The need to 
regulate the activities of the industry has led to attempts 
to classify these relationships as well. According to the 
UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (2010, 25), 
there are four different types of relationship between states 
and private suppliers of security services. Contracting 
states are those that ‘directly contract with PMSCs for their 
services, including, as appropriate, where such a company 
subcontracts with another PMSC’. States of operation are 
the countries where PMSCs operate. Home states are the 
ones in which PMSCs are registered. Last, third states are 
states ‘other than the contracting, home States or States 
of operations whose nationals are employed to work for a 
PMSC’. 
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The very idea of classifying PMSCs is for some analysts 
pointless given the diversity in and volatility of the industry. 
Corporation closures, mergers and acquisitions are 
indeed very regular occurrences. Likewise, the retraction, 
expansion or redirection of the activities of PMSCs is 
frequently determined by the contracts that they secure 
and/or the prevailing trends in the demand for certain 
services. Hence, the assignment of permanent labels to 
PMSCs might be impossible. However, different types of 
PMSCs pose different normative and policy questions. 
Furthermore, on a more theoretical level, the above 
classifications and conceptual constructions provide a 
common language, a kind of toolkit, that is essential for 
the formulation of hypotheses and arguments aiming to 
comprehend the radical changes that are taking place in 
the domain of security. The rest of the study draws on the 
above classifications and typologies to problematise the 
implications of the private supply of security services.
The Argument and Structure of the Study
The commodification of security is according to all 
indications a rapidly growing trend in the international 
system. The burgeoning of the private security industry is 
driven by the increased interest of both public (e.g. states 
and international organisations) and private actors (e.g. 
NGOs, MNCs and individuals) to contract out security-
related services. In this context, the question of whether 
public and private actors should outsource security services 
seems to be of little relevance. 
This study is informed by a conviction that the 
implications of outsourcing security services to private 
agencies are not a priori positive or negative: everything 
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boils down to the questions of when and how a public or 
private actor contracts out security services. 
With regard to the ‘when’, the short answer has two 
parts: when it does not concern, inherently governmental 
functions, and when there is a good reason to do so. One 
definition of ‘inherently governmental functions’ maintains 
that they are ‘intimately related to the public interest’ 
(Luckey et al. 2010, 7). The vagueness of the definition is 
not accidental. What every state might reserve for itself is 
ultimately context-specific. As Hood (1997, 123) puts it, it 
depends on ‘what values the state takes as basic’. Each 
state might draw the line at a different point beyond the 
apparent exclusion of outsourcing such functions as war-
making. To illustrate, Petersohn (2010, 539) explains that 
while the US is informed by a Lockean tradition of liberalism 
and relies greatly on market solutions, Germany is inspired 
by a Rousseauian tradition of liberalism and has less 
confidence in market forces. In this respect, it might be futile 
to prescribe to states where they should stop outsourcing 
services. Having said that, this study does not imply 
that states should simply resort to the external supply of 
security services from private actors for every non inherently 
governmental function. Outsourcing has frequently appeared 
to be a not-so-optimal solution in terms of cost efficiency or 
effectiveness. States should therefore always have a clear 
rationale for privileging market solutions for the supply of 
security services. 
This study pays particular attention to the question of 
how states should contract out security services. It argues 
that many of the problems stemming from the outsourcing 
of security services are related to shortcomings in the 
operation of the private market for this type of service.  
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The study analytically divides and presents these 
shortcomings into three categories of problems: 
I)  inefficient contract management, 
II)  the widespread impunity of corporations and contractors 
in cases of improper conduct and serious crimes, and 
III) the lack of an international regulatory framework. 
The first section discusses the main factors that seem 
to have contributed to the growth of the contemporary 
private market for security services. It refers to changes 
in international and domestic conditions such as the 
emergence of a trend to downsize police and military 
expenditures. It also presents the alleged comparative 
advantages of the private security industry. 
The second section demonstrates that security is 
being increasingly transformed from a public or common 
good into a largely private good. This section shows that 
a combination of public and private provision of security 
could be advantageous if states do not follow the path of 
reducing resources and limiting operational objectives as 
the private security supply expands. Moreover, the study 
warns about the political externalities that the uncontrolled 
commodification of security might generate.
The next section brings to light the most important 
deficiencies that have been recurrently observed in the 
contract management practices of states in the sector of 
security services. These deficiencies include the awarding 
of non-competitive contracts, excessive reliance on ‘cost-
plus’ types of contracts and inefficient post-award contract 
oversight. As a result, the outsourcing of security services 
has frequently ended up being much more costly than 
originally expected.
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Finally, the fourth section shows that, in the private 
security sector, impunity prevails at both corporate and 
individual levels. It refers to serious cases of misconduct 
involving crimes such as human rights violations. It also 
presents some multilateral efforts that have been developed 
to codify international rules and articulate principles that 
might somehow regulate the operation of PMSCs. The 
section argues that inter-state disagreements on rule-setting 
reflect different levels of reliance on market solutions for 
security services. 
In sum, this study analyses various issues that have 
arisen to date from the operation of the market for PMSCs 
and presents some thoughts on how to make the practice of 
privatising aspects of security provision more beneficial to 
the public interest.
The Driving Forces Behind the 
Growth of the Private Security 
Market
Many factors seem to have contributed to the growth of 
the private security industry. For analytical purposes, these 
explanatory factors can be divided into two categories: 
first, the changing international and domestic conditions 
that have stimulated the growth of the demand for security 
services, and second, the alleged comparative advantages 
of the industry.  
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The Enabling Conditions 
The growth of the private market for security services 
can be explained by reference to various enabling factors. 
First is the change in the global demand for and supply 
of security forces (Singer 2001/02, 193). The collapse of 
state structures in many weak or failing states and the 
outbreak of numerous conflicts have led to multiple calls 
from incumbent regimes, dissidents, NGOs and even MNCs 
(that have, for instance, invested in the extraction of natural 
resources) for the dispatch of external armed contingents to 
different locations around the world. Nevertheless, Western 
powers have been reluctant to get entangled in conflicts 
where no major national interests are at stake (Brooks 2000, 
132–4; Shearer 1998, 70). For some analysts, this is due to 
casualty aversion in Western societies. Others refer to the 
unpreparedness of traditional armed forces to operate in 
environments such as low-intensity civil wars (Brayton 2002, 
308). In any case, a gap has emerged between the demand 
for and supply of external armed forces that has been filled 
by the rise of the private security sector. 
Many analysts also suggest that there is a strong 
correlation between the post-9/11 growth of the private 
security industry and the military interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. According to a recent study, these 
wars (and the subsequent post-conflict stabilisation 
efforts) cost the US alone between $3.7 and $4.4 trillion 
from 2001 to 2011.1 Unsurprisingly, the war expenses 
of the DoD were the ‘largest single component’ of the 
1  These figures exclude several categories of costs such as promised reconstruction aid 
to Afghanistan and additional macroeconomic consequences (Eisenhower Study Group 
2011, 6–7).
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economic costs (Eisenhower Study Group 2011, 6–7). 
Undeniably, the services supplied by contractors were 
a large proportion of the overall cost. This is why it has 
been argued that a private security bubble has resulted 
(Donald 2006). Although one cannot deny the effect of 
the global war on terror on the growth of the industry, 
we should keep in mind that the private security sector 
keeps expanding despite the fact that the US has begun to 
disengage from Afghanistan and Iraq.
Another group of explanations for the rise of the private 
security sector focuses on the transformation of the public 
police forces and the military in many Western countries in 
line with their overall effort to reduce public expenditures. 
The reform of public police forces began in some states 
as early as the early 1980s. Loader (1999, 375–6) explains 
that the public police forces changed their rhetoric and their 
practices at this time, integrating the imperatives and the 
vocabulary of the market (i.e. managerialism, consumerism 
and promotionalism). In addition, many countries privatised 
or outsourced security functions such as prisons, 
immigration control and airport security (Krahmann 2008, 
393). Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 4) remark that states 
also began to place greater emphasis on the development 
of crime control techniques based on efficiency, surveillance 
and spatial design. And Garland (1996, 452) suggests that 
some states developed ‘responsibilization strategies’ (using 
terms such as ‘activating communities’, generating ‘active 
citizens’ and ‘help for self-help’) in order to bring about 
action on the part of private agencies and individuals. As 
a result, not only did states pass the supply of many of 
their police services to the private security sector, they also 
encouraged the expansion of the industry’s activities at the 
level of society. 
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As far as military reforms are concerned, most countries 
in Europe and North America made substantial cuts to 
their defence budgets following the end of the Cold War. 
They downsized their armies and demobilised entire units, 
generating a surplus of military expertise, part of which was 
directed towards the private security industry. The market’s 
very competitive remuneration rates attracted the attention 
of both demobilised and active officers, alarming some 
states about the danger of ‘brain-drain’ to their armed forces 
(Spearin 2005, 247). 
Contemporary militaries are not only smaller in size, 
they are substantially different in terms of organisation 
and composition. Petersohn (2010, 540) suggests that the 
template of the armed forces has shifted from the model 
of self-sufficiency to the model of ‘core competency’: the 
armed forces are nowadays concentrating on their core 
competences and they outsource most other aspects of 
their operations to private providers. Moreover, for their 
capital assets, they resort to new procurement methods 
such as private finance initiatives and public–private 
partnerships (Krahmann 2005, 253). Altogether, the 
transformed militaries rely more and more on the private 
security industry for the acquisition of military resources and 
the performance of security functions. Not surprisingly, the 
United States Department of Defense (2006, 75) Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report incorporated the contractors 
into the military’s total force and presented them as a 
constitutive part of its ‘warfighting capability and capacity’. 
Subsequently, private contractors have outnumbered US 
troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
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The Alleged Advantages of the Private Security Industry
Supporters of the work of the private security industry 
advance a series of arguments to make the case for the 
outsourcing of this type of service to private agencies. 
First, they stress the opportunity offered to states to make 
substantial cutbacks to their public expenditures. More 
precisely, in times of peace, states can avoid the cost of 
training and maintaining large standing armies because, if 
they ever need extra military capabilities, they will be able 
to seek them directly in the private market (Fredland 2004, 
210–15). Moreover, when developed countries contract 
PMSCs to carry out tasks in third regions, it brings down 
operational costs substantially. This is because private 
security service suppliers may subcontract tasks to local (or 
third country) workers at lower wages than they would have 
paid to nationals of the contracting countries. The largest 
PMSCs have indeed taken extensive advantage of labour 
cost differences among nationals of different countries 
and have assembled in most operations ‘highly globalized’ 
workforces (McCoy 2010, 676). Suffice it to say that US 
and coalition citizens currently represent around 8.8% of 
all PMSC contractors in Iraq and merely 2.8% of all private 
contractors in Afghanistan (United States Central Command 
2011, 3). Overall, the argument of saving money is indeed 
very powerful at present, given the global economic crisis 
and the struggle of many states to find ways to scale down 
their large deficits and debt burdens. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that the human resources 
of PMSCs include military veterans acclaimed for their 
professionalism, excellent qualifications and experience. 
Owing to the fact that private contractors have economic 
rather than ideological motivations, they are allegedly even 
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less likely to purposefully harm civilians than state actors. 
PMSCs also help restore public order and security and 
combat crime with their work. In cases of failed (or failing) 
states, the deployment of private security contractors 
represents a very credible alternative to reliance on local 
security forces that might have received poor professional 
training or have developed a track record of human rights 
violations and excessive use of violence (Leander 2005a, 
609–10). In this type of setting, private contractors provide 
protection for the deployed internationals (e.g. UN personnel 
and NGO workers) and facilitate the immediate distribution 
of relief assistance (Brayton 2002, 321). The forces of private 
companies may also feature higher operational readiness, 
coherence and efficiency than the ad hoc multinational 
missions of international organisations that deploy slowly 
and often are then tormented by internal conflicts among 
their national components (Bures 2005, 540–1). In addition, 
PMCs claim that they can even be used in cases where 
the international community lacks the will, cohesion and 
readiness to act to prevent the outbreak of humanitarian 
disasters (Bures 2005, 539). They cite as a paradigmatic 
case the failure of the international community to prevent the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994. According to Shearer (2001, 
30), ‘if a private force, operating with international authority 
and within international law, can protect civilians, how moral 
is it deny people protection just because states can’t or 
won’t find the forces to do it?’
The forces of PMCs can moreover deploy in conflict-
ridden regions for longer periods than state militaries 
usually do. While governments are frequently under 
domestic pressure to withdraw their forces from high-risk 
environments in third countries as soon as possible, PMCs 
do not face similar restrictions (Brayton 2002, 318).  
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As a result, the latter provide a practical solution for 
medium-term tasks in post-conflict settings. Interestingly, 
PMCs also provide governments with the cover of ‘plausible 
deniability’, the option to avoid taking responsibility for the 
undesired consequences of those companies’ operations 
(Mandel 2001, 132). 
Proponents of outsourcing security services to private 
suppliers also assert that the latter can make the difference 
because of the level of expertise they provide. They remark 
that the success of military operations today is directly 
correlated with the use of sophisticated technological 
systems, for which the majority of military personnel does 
not have the appropriate training. For example, the US has 
relied on PMCs for the maintenance and use of state-of-
the-art weapon systems, such as the Predator and Global 
Hawk unmanned aircrafts (Mobley 2004, 24). Similarly, a 
state’s participation in specific international actions of post-
conflict reconstruction is related to its ability to send civilian 
experts (e.g. civil engineers), who are otherwise not required 
in the armed forces. PMCs can also be very efficient due 
to the practice of hiring regional expertise. Mobley (2004, 
24) recalls that some private companies operating in Iraq 
employed a large number of individuals who were familiar 
with the region and contributed to tasks ranging from 
extinguishing oil-well fires to building projects.
In the area of military organisation and training, private 
companies expand states’ capabilities to protect their 
territorial integrity. They also provide advice on improving 
civil–military relations and, in this way, make an important 
contribution to the process of democratisation (Singer 
2001/02, 217). In addition, a study of the work of DynCorp in 
Liberia demonstrated that PMCs are capable of generating 
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innovative ideas for the reform of an army instead of 
uncritically introducing the ‘ill-fitting’ procedures and practices 
of other countries. As McFate (2008, 647, 652) explains, 
this is a feature of the work of PMCs that stands in sharp 
contrast with the way the US ‘train and equip’ programmes 
are implemented. The latter typically strive to apply the 
inappropriate template of the US Army to the militaries 
of other countries. Moreover, in terms of military support 
services (e.g. logistics), outsourcing to private enterprises 
allows states to dedicate a larger part of their military staff 
to the deployment of war capabilities, resulting in a more 
combat-ready and professional force (Leibstone 2007, 6). 
Finally, the private security industry asserts that it is 
flexible enough to quickly come up with reliable solutions for 
the management of new or escalating threats. For instance, 
the recent increase in incidents of piracy in Somalia 
prompted some private security corporations to advertise 
specially tailored anti-pirate protection services. Although 
many analysts expressed concern that the armed protection 
of merchant ships might lead to the escalation of violence, 
some shipping firms have indeed contracted this type of 
service (Bennett 2010). 
In essence, it is claimed that the sector of private security 
service suppliers is growing precisely because states have 
left vacant a ‘pressing security gap’ that needs to be filled 
(Mandel 2001, 132). Contractor corporations arise to satisfy 
a market need. Hence, if the companies in question did not 
exist or were outlawed, illegitimate agencies would enter the 
market to provide the required services (Leander 2005a, 610). 
Moreover, it is suggested that the actions of PMSCs do not 
challenge or question states and their sovereignty. States 
maintain some control over the sector of private security.  
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They represent the largest clients in the market and 
they are in some cases even co-owners of contractor 
corporations. Many PMCs will indeed avoid taking on a 
contract if their home countries vehemently disapprove. 
PMSCs should therefore be seen as mere ‘tools’ at the 
disposal of states, international organisations, NGOs, 
enterprises and citizens for the protection of their safety 
(Leander 2005b, 806–7). The next sections scrutinise the 
merits of this claim.
 
Security as a Good,  
and Political Externalities 
The private supply of an increasing number of security 
services has consequences for the essence of security 
itself. It affects the type of good that security is and raises 
the following questions: Who appropriates the benefits 
of privately supplied security services? What are the 
political implications of the transformation of security into a 
commodity? 
Security as a Good 
To comprehend the content of the changes that the 
privatisation of security brings about, we should briefly 
turn the discussion to the economics. The public goods 
literature suggests that there are four main types of goods: 
public, private, common and club goods. A public good 
has two main features: it is non-excludable and non-rival 
in consumption. While the public good’s non-excludability 
Contracting out to Private Military and Security Companies
26
implies that no-one can be denied access to its benefits, its 
non-rivalness means that its use by one or more individuals 
does not diminish its availability for consumption by others 
(Buchanan 1999, 48). The most commonly referred to 
example of a public good is probably national defence.
Private goods have the exact opposite features: they 
are excludable and rival. Samuelson (1955, 350) illustrates 
the properties of private goods with bread, ‘whose total 
can be parcelled out among two or more persons, with one 
man having a loaf less if another gets a loaf more’. Private 
goods are tradable and their supply and price depend on the 
operation of market mechanisms. 
Presumably, a large number of goods and services 
fall between the two ends of the spectrum. Most non-
excludable goods are indeed rival in consumption: the more 
benefits that are appropriated by one party, the fewer will 
be available to others. These are ‘common goods’ and the 
fact that access to them is open to everybody usually raises 
concerns about congestion. The most widely cited example 
is non-renewable natural resources whose overuse is 
described as ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). 
Similarly, non-rival goods may be excludable. These are 
the ‘club goods’ whose membership (and ‘optimal sharing 
group’) is larger than ‘one person or family but smaller than 
an infinitely large number’ (Buchanan 1965, 2). An illustration 
of club goods is the services and products reserved only for 
club subscribers.
Arguably, both public and private providers can supply 
excludable, rival and non-rival goods. However, private 
actors find it difficult to supply non-excludable goods.  
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This is because private companies cannot overcome 
the ‘free-rider problem’, the possibility that some of the 
beneficiaries of a good or service might be reluctant to 
contribute towards its costs (Buchanan 1999, 83). States, 
however, can finance the supply of common and public 
goods through taxation (Olson 1965, 13–14).
The conceptual analysis of different types of goods 
demonstrates that national security from external military 
threats is a paradigmatic case of a public good. Each 
sovereign country indiscriminately protects its entire 
population from external military aggression. And the 
security each inhabitant enjoys within the territory of a state 
does not subtract from the level of protection offered to all 
others. The recourse of states to the outsourcing of services 
in the domain of national security does not greatly change 
the picture. To the extent that PMSCs are contracted to 
contribute to a country’s defence efforts, they do not affect 
the non-excludable and non-rival nature of national security 
(see figure 2).  
Figure 2 National Security as a Good
Figure 3 Sub-state or Individual Security as a Good
Public providers 
Private providers 
Security is a public good
Security is a public good
Public providers 
Private providers 
Security is a common good (e.g. policing)
Security is a club good (e.g. gated communities)
Security is a private good
Public providers 
Private providers 
Security is a public good
Security is a public good
Public providers 
Private providers 
Security is a common good (e.g. policing)
Security is a club good (e.g. gated communities)
Security is a private good
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Things are somewhat different in the case of protection 
services (i.e. policing) at the sub-state and individual levels. 
As Engerer (2011, 139) remarks, if security is interpreted as 
a ‘tangible good’ (i.e. as an actual provision and not as an 
intangible feeling), police protection services will not qualify 
as a pure public good. They should instead be considered 
as a common good. Notwithstanding that police forces 
strive to protect all residents from threats to their security, 
they cannot deploy officers everywhere to instantly prevent 
the occurrence of crime. The fact that the concentration of 
police force in one location reduces the available resources 
for deployment elsewhere implies that police protection 
is a rival good. Furthermore, in contrast with state-level 
security, protection services at both the sub-state and 
individual levels are contracted out by both public (e.g. 
states, international organisations and local governments) 
and private actors (e.g. NGOs, MNCs, local businesses 
and individuals). When the contracting parties are private 
agencies, security provision is excludable: its beneficiaries 
are specific groups (e.g. gated communities and shopping 
centres) or individuals. As a result, rather than being a 
common good, security protection can be simultaneously a 
club and a private good (see figure 3). 
The combination of public and private policing services 
is not a priori a positive or negative development. If the 
public police services continue unabated their efforts to 
protect people and their property, the additional contracting 
of privately supplied security services will enhance the 
overall level of security. However, in many places, public 
police forces have reduced their services (and limited their 
operational objectives) as the private security industry has 
grown in size and responsibilities. As a result, an entirely 
different mixture of services composed of common goods 
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and club and private goods has taken shape (Engerer 2011, 
142). The supply of marketable and excludable security 
services has expanded at the expense of the supply of 
non-excludable services designated to protect the entire 
public. This implies that the differences in security provision, 
according to the wish and the ability of the people to 
afford privately supplied services, have been accentuated 
(Loader 1999, 374–7). What is more, the fragmentation 
and individualisation of security provision (owing to its 
excludability) has not allowed the beneficiaries to share the 
cost of protection (Krahmann 2008, 394). 
Krahmann (2008, 382–3) highlights another negative 
aspect of the transformation of security into a largely 
excludable marketable commodity. The aims of protection 
have changed. If security is managed as a public or common 
good, policing will strive to prevent the appearance of a 
threat. Nonetheless, if security is perceived as a club or 
private good, policing will concentrate either on deterring 
the materialisation of the threat that is within the realm of 
possibility (e.g. by increasing the cost of carrying out the 
threat), or on the management of its consequences. Hence, 
the provision of protection as an excludable good focuses 
on the consequences rather than the causes of insecurity. 
Krahmann (2008, 393) explains that ‘private companies rarely 
engage in prevention because it is difficult to prove that their 
efforts have been successful’. In any case, if some people are 
able to deter human-initiated threats to their physical security 
and their property, the probability that all the others become 
the target of aggression will be increased. Therefore, the 
lowering of the level of policing as a common good coupled 
with the growth of the perception of policing as a club and 
private good have seriously aggravated the insecurity of those 
lacking the resources to pay for privately supplied services.
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Political Externalities
The commodification of security generates important spillover 
effects not taken into account by the market. First of all, it 
releases states from at least part of their responsibility to 
provide protection to their citizens. Admittedly, since the 
1980s some states, such as the UK, have attempted to 
encourage action by private agencies and individuals through 
so-called responsibilisation strategies. These strategies did 
not imply a ‘simple off-loading of state functions’. Although 
the responsibilisation strategies facilitated the growth of the 
private security sector, they represent in Garland’s (1996, 
454) words ‘a new form of governance-at-a-distance’. States 
assumed an additional set of ‘co-ordinating and activating 
roles’ with the aim of improving the efficiency of their security 
institutions. In this respect, the responsibilisation strategies 
were an attempt to supplement public policing with private 
services. The contemporary substitution of public security 
provision with excludable privately supplied services, on 
the other hand, reduces the importance of state policing 
(Crawford 2006, 112). At both the transnational and sub-state 
levels, the people are regarded as consumers of security 
services, free to search the market for the most suitable 
solution for their protection. Loader (1999, 384–5) asserts 
that the transformation of citizens (endowed with the right 
to state protection) into consumers implies that policing is 
disassociated and alienated from ‘questions of democracy, 
equity and justice’. In this regard, security is gradually 
becoming depoliticised; from a major political question it 
becomes a technical one that is subject to a private solution 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, 5). 
In the case of extraterritorial operations, the private 
security industry presents the depoliticisation of security 
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as one of its advantages. The PMSCs claim that they 
offer technical solutions and do not carry any ‘political 
baggage’ into the field of operations. However, this 
process of depoliticisation does not absolve the practice 
of outsourcing the supply of security services from any 
political consequences. First of all, the recourse of a 
state to outsourcing security services may be interpreted 
as indicating a disinclination to send out its own forces 
(Spearin 2005, 245). Moreover, as Olsson (2007, 347–8) 
points out, although the PMSCs portray themselves as 
‘apolitical technicians of pacification’, their deployment is 
frequently considered illegitimate and is resisted by the local 
populations in states of operation.
The implications of the depoliticisation of security 
are also noticeable at the level of national security. In 
the US, for instance, successive administrations have 
utilised the outsourcing of security services as a method 
of circumventing Congressional opposition to certain 
policies. The practice of contracting out security services 
has in this way contributed to strengthening the executive 
at the expense of the legislative branch of government. 
The absence of debate in the legislature reduces the 
media coverage and public disclosure of the outsourcing 
of security services. A case in point is the information 
publicly released about the casualties in the operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the results of an 
18-month-long investigation by ProPublica, 2010 was 
‘the first time in history that corporate casualties have 
outweighed military losses on America’s battlefields’ (Miller 
2010). Yet, most of the contractor deaths are not reported in 
the United States. This is because the DoD does not issue 
press releases about the deaths of contractors and the US 
media displays little interest in these incidents given that 
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the overwhelming majority of security contractors in these 
locations are not US citizens.
Leander (2005b, 820–1) plausibly claims that security 
issues are debated beyond the public realm (and out of 
the reach of the civil component of the state and of civil 
society) in a ‘restricted sphere’ that includes the executive, 
the military, the secret services and PMSCs. Thus, it is 
feared that private security service providers are granted 
a disproportionately large role in the determination of the 
content of security discourses and the corresponding 
policies. This is because, aside from their advertising 
campaigns, the PMSCs can exploit the additional 
opportunities offered by their operation as interest groups 
and their participation in intelligence gathering and analysis, 
as well as their consulting services in the fields of law 
enforcement and military organisation and training. 
In terms of lobbying, the link between PMSCs and politics 
was documented long ago. The most widely known case is 
probably that of the ties of Dick Cheney with Halliburton (the 
private corporation of which he was chief executive before 
running for Vice President), an issue that was discussed 
during the 2004 US presidential elections (Rosenbaum 2004).
With respect to intelligence gathering and analysis, the 
role of private contractors has grown substantially over time. 
According to some estimates, 70% of the US intelligence 
budget currently goes to services supplied by around 
70,000 contractors (a quarter of whom are engaged in core 
intelligence activities) (Voelz 2009, 587). PMCs participate 
in the filtering and assessment of incoming information and 
thus affect the way different questions are processed and 
framed for policymaking. 
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Interestingly, the training programmes outsourced to 
PMCs represent an additional avenue that may be exploited 
in order to influence the prevalent assumptions and thinking 
about national security. Olsson (2007, 354) notes that private 
firms are frequently allowed to determine the content of 
the training programmes and, similarly, shape the values 
whose protection should take priority. Moreover, the tactical 
and technical training of PMCs largely determines the 
range of possibilities that state security institutions have at 
their disposal to respond to certain situations in the future 
(Leander 2005b, 817; Olsson 2007, 354). If we add to the 
picture the rest of the consulting services that private firms 
supply—MPRI, for instance, provides ‘wide ranging doctrine 
development support’ to the US army (MPRI n.d.b, 1)—we 
can see that PMSCs have various ways to exert influence on 
the assessment, prioritisation and management of threats by 
states. 
The participation of private security service suppliers in 
the articulation of security discourses and in the selection 
of relevant policies is worrying. This is because the supply 
of security services is allowed to create its own demand 
(Leander 2005a, 612). Arguably, private companies want 
demand for their services to expand in order for them to 
survive and develop within the free market. Therefore they 
have a motive to exaggerate the challenges to security or 
even contribute to the securitisation of new threats, only to 
claim that they alone have the necessary tools to manage 
them (Krahmann 2008, 390–3). Similarly, these companies 
may contribute to the downplaying of threats for which they 
have no services and show preference for their own tools to 
face other problems (regardless of whether they are suitable 
or not) (Leander 2005a, 611–13). 
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To sum up, the depoliticisation of national security 
contributes to the legitimisation of security discourses 
with technical, military and managerial content and to the 
increased militarisation of security policies. The risk here 
is that problems requiring political solutions may not be 
properly resolved or, even worse, may be exacerbated due 
to the selection of policies necessitating the employment of 
military or police means (Leander 2005b, 824).
 
Contract Management  
and Cost Efficiency
Many of the anticipated advantages of contracting out 
security services presuppose that the market for these 
services operates smoothly. However, this is usually not 
the case. The previous paragraphs have illustrated how 
the supply of services might influence the generation of its 
own demand. This section elaborates on some additional 
problems in the operation of the private security market. 
First, states often do not allow the competition among 
companies to work to their advantage and grant no-bid 
contracts to PMSCs. A study by the Center for Public 
Integrity found in 2004 that only 40% of all US DoD 
contracts had been conducted under ‘full and open 
competition’ in the preceding six years (Makinson 2004). 
A state may decide to sign a no-bid contract for several 
reasons. It might be concerned with preserving the reliability 
and continuity of supply (Avant 2004, 22; Mobley 2004, 31), 
or it may want to avoid the transaction cost of a competitive 
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bid. In either of these cases, the bidding company would 
not particularly worry whether its offer is competitive in 
terms of market price. There is always the danger that a 
rival company may protest the no-bid procedure and seek 
compensation from the contracting state. For instance, 
DynCorp International filed a protest in December 2009 
against the decision of the US DoD not to call for a 
competitive bid for the contract for civilian police training 
in Afghanistan (Business Wire 2010). The United States 
General Accounting Office (2010b, 9–10) examined the case 
and upheld the protest. 
A state may also resort to awarding a no-bid contract 
when it needs a service for which there is only one provider 
in the market. According to the Center for Public Integrity, 
this is indeed the main cause for 67% of all non-competitive 
contracts awarded by the US DoD (Makinson 2004). A good 
illustration is the outsourcing of the operation of specific 
high technology systems. Arguably, when a private company 
occupies a monopoly position in the market, states are 
dependent on its services and are very vulnerable to any 
disruptions to supply (Mobley 2004, 25–6). 
The private security market does not only function 
improperly when states do not call for competitive bids. As 
Avant (2002, 2) remarks, when private companies compete 
for long-term contracts they often bid low, knowing that if 
they get the contracts they can later exceed the cost of the 
services. PMSCs frequently adopt this type of opportunistic 
behaviour when the contracts are awarded on a ‘cost-plus’ 
basis. In this type of contract, the contractors are paid for all 
of the costs incurred plus an additional amount for profit. In 
the case of ‘fixed-price’ contracts, the contractors provide a 
firm price for their services that will not normally be subject 
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to adjustments if the cost of the services increases (i.e. the 
contractors may even find themselves providing services at 
a loss). Although cost-plus contracts minimise the possibility 
that contractors compromise on the quality of the supplied 
services out of cost considerations, their main drawback is 
that they provide no incentive for cost efficiency, and they 
require increased oversight to avoid abuse (Makinson 2004).
The most important problems with the outsourcing 
of security services are indeed related to poor contract 
oversight by public institutions. More often than not, 
this happens in extraterritorial operations. Admittedly, 
it is extremely difficult to properly review all contracted 
actions and identify every small-scale problem or fraud. 
In Iraq alone, the US executed 34,728 contracts or grants 
amounting to $35.9 billion between the onset of the 
war and June 2011 (Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction 2011, 43). In this type of operation, private 
security service suppliers should be given some leeway 
in the implementation of contracts so that they can cope 
with the uncertainty of conflict/post-conflict environments 
(Krahmann 2008, 809). 
However, it is one thing to claim that states should 
encourage PMSCs to bring innovative thinking to their work; 
it is an entirely different matter to observe that states do 
not possess the necessary resources to properly supervise 
the execution of all contracts. Contracting states have not 
recruited a sufficient number of suitably trained officers, nor 
have they established appropriate procedures to allow them 
to efficiently oversee the implementation of the actions they 
outsource to private companies abroad. In the case of the 
US, for example, the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (2007, 
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30) made some startling findings. In the 1992–2006 period, 
the dollar value of US army contracts increased by 331% 
and the number of army contract actions increased by 
654%. However, not only did the US refrain from increasing 
its army acquisition personnel at a commensurate rate, it 
even substantially reduced the relevant bureaucracy during 
the same period. While in 1990 the US Army’s contracting 
personnel consisted of approximately 10,000 people, it 
was downsized to approximately 5,500 people in 1996 and 
has remained constant since then (Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations 2007, 30).2 Not surprisingly, only 38% of the total 
US Army acquisition/contracting staff deployed in theatre 
operations are certified for the positions held (Commission on 
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations 2007, 28). In Afghanistan, for example, contracting 
personnel ‘with no engineering background’ were frequently 
sent to oversee construction projects and could not 
ascertain whether the buildings they oversaw conformed to 
the drawing plans’ technical specifications (United States 
General Accounting Office 2011b, 6). Presumably, the lack of 
competence of the officer charged with overseeing a contract 
could potentially be exploited by the contracted company. 
Furthermore, in some instances, the army officers did not 
efficiently administer the privately supplied services because 
they were unaware of all deployed contractors, or did not 
know the extent of their authority over the work of the latter 
(Mobley 2004, 27–8). 
The US has apparently paid insufficient attention to 
the management of its contracts. In September 2009, the 
2  Indeed, the US Army’s acquisition personnel was reduced by another 2.6% between 
2001 and 2008 (United States General Accounting Office 2011b, 6).
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United States General Accounting Office (2009, 2) reviewed 
69 audits of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and found 
that in 65 of them there were serious ‘deficiencies that 
rendered them unreliable for decisions on contract awards 
and contract management and oversight.’ In addition, the US 
Army increasingly outsources contract oversight to private 
corporations. However, the Army has also not developed 
any mechanisms to check whether oversight contactors 
properly supervise the work of the contracted security service 
providers (Smith and Bauman 2011). More worryingly, in some 
cases contract oversight has even rested on self-evaluation: 
private firms have been allowed to set contract prices, define 
performance evaluation criteria and assess their own activities 
(Leander 2005a, 613). As one analyst claims, elsewhere in the 
private sector, such a practice would be ‘a certain recipe for 
overcharging and inefficiency’ (Leander 2005b, 821). 
Contract oversight is additionally complicated by the 
imperative of avoiding any disruptions to the supply of 
services in the critical domain of security. A good case 
in point is what happened in 2004, when a US Army 
contracting official who was overseeing the implementation 
of the KBR contract in Iraq determined that the corporation 
had not provided credible data or records for expenses of 
more than $1 billion. The army officer decided to withhold 
15% of payments and the performance bonuses (2%) until 
the company properly justified the expenses. KBR argued 
that if it did not receive full payment, it would have to cut 
back on services. The US Army subsequently removed its 
contracting officer from the case and replaced him with 
a private consulting firm, RCI Holding Corporation. The 
latter overlooked the DoD audit and deemed that the KBR 
spending was justified. Although the US Army denied that 
the officer’s removal had anything to do with the KBR case, 
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it is worth citing what Jeffrey P. Parsons, Executive Director 
of the Army Contracting Command, said about the case: 
‘You have to understand the circumstances at the time …. 
We could not let operational support suffer because of some 
other things’ (Risen 2008). 
In this context, some PMSCs have had the opportunity 
to commit various kinds of fraud, waste, abuse and 
mismanagement. Many companies have routinely exceeded 
the cost foreseen for their services and some of them have 
on several occasions overcharged contracting states.  
For instance, the United States Department of Defense 
Inspector General (2011, 17) estimated that the US paid 
$160 to $204 million more than a price or cost analysis 
would justify for the supply of fuel in Iraq. In addition, the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2011, v) 
disclosed that he questioned almost 40% of the reviewed 
expenses of Anham LLC. 
Moreover, companies have sometimes charged states 
with expenses that were not included in contracts. For 
example, Supreme Foodservice charged the US $454.9 
million for services to the airlift fresh fruit and vegetables 
to Afghanistan even though the airlift was not required 
in the contract (United States Department of Defense 
Inspector General 2011, 17). A less costly though far more 
embarrassing example is the charge that Blackwater 
(according to two of its former employees) billed the US 
State Department for the salary of a prostitute, hired to 
provide services to the company’s male employees in Kabul 
(Isenberg 2010). 
In other cases, companies have been accused of 
providing superfluous services. For instance, in Kosovo 
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KBR installed electricity backup capacity at all of the US 
military bases even though only some facilities needed such 
capability (Krahmann 2005, 260). Furthermore, companies 
occasionally attempt to reduce the cost of their services with 
actions that endanger the success of operations. Mobley 
(2004, 27) recalls that from 2001 to 2002 Airscan utilised 
unencrypted commercial television relays to transmit US 
military intelligence data. Hence, anyone with a normal 
satellite TV receiver could watch US surveillance operations 
as they were taking place. What is more, at times PMSCs 
have completed their work but delivered outcomes of 
questionable quality. For example, KBR has been accused 
of delivering ‘highly polluted’ water to the US Army in Iraq 
(Petersohn 2010, 534).  
Another dimension of poor contract oversight has 
to do with the personnel of the contracted PMSCs. The 
operation of the global contract chain with its multiple 
tiers of subcontractors means that states do not know 
who is providing services on their behalf. Interestingly, 
contracting states may also lose sight of the type of duties 
that contractors are carrying out. According to a study by 
the United States General Accounting Office (2011a, 19) 
conducted in 24 US Army command and headquarters 
sites, there were 2,357 contractors carrying out inherently 
governmental functions, 1,877 contractors supplying 
unauthorised personnel services, and 45,934 contractors 
performing activities closely associated with inherently 
governmental functions at these locations. The first two 
categories of functions should not be carried out by 
contracted personnel; the latter requires vigorous oversight 
and management.
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Ineffective contract management renders highly 
questionable the economic benefits of outsourcing security 
services. The Project on Government Oversight (2011) has 
attempted to build a database of all cases of misconduct 
by the 100 major DoD contractors (i.e. including defence 
industry firms) since 1995. Relying on public records 
and excluding cases of undisclosed settlements or of 
settlements where the financial terms were unclear, the 
‘Federal Contractor Misconduct Database’ has identified 
835 instances of misconduct with costs collectively 
amounting to more than $26 billion. This is a price that no 
contracting state has ever agreed to pay. On the other hand, 
vigorous contract oversight is not cost-free. And the cost 
of contract management is rarely calculated when a state 
considers outsourcing certain services (Avant 2002, 2). 
Several reports have challenged the argument that 
outsourcing security services is almost by definition the 
most economically beneficial option. With respect to private 
military services, outsourcing seems to be less costly mainly 
when it concerns simple and repetitive tasks requiring 
low-skilled labour. However, when the tasks are more 
complex, contracting out security services is frequently a 
more expensive option (Petersohn 2010, 536). In the case of 
private security services, recent reports have questioned the 
cost savings of privatising prisons. A study of the Arizona 
Department of Corrections revealed that private prisons 
are less expensive owing to the fact that they ‘cherry-pick’, 
selecting to house only relatively healthy inmates (Oppel 
2011).
Finally, from a different perspective, many analysts 
have suggested caution in contracting out to the market 
the supply of all types of security services. The provision 
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of security should not be left ‘at the mercy of any change 
in market costs and incentives’ (Singer 2003). Arguably, 
PMSCs are primarily motivated by profit like any other 
private corporation. And their contracts with states are 
not governed by military law. In this respect, they may be 
tempted to pull out of an operation that turns out to be 
unprofitable; they may want to avoid endangering their 
corporate assets; and they may attempt to cut corners on 
essential aspects of operations (Shearer 1998; Carbonnier 
2006, 408). The previous paragraphs have highlighted a few 
cases in which PMSCs sought to maximise profits with no 
consideration whatsoever of public interest. The next section 
turns to cases of misconduct involving the illegitimate use of 
violence and human rights violations.
 
Impunity and Regulation
Illegitimate Violence, Human Rights and Impunity
A large part of the criticism directed at PMSCs is the result 
of media revelations of incidents in which their employees 
participated in acts of human rights violations or other 
criminal activities. In Iraq, for example, PSC employees 
repeatedly used excessive violence, not even hesitating to 
open fire on and kill non-belligerents. In one incident on 16 
September 2007, Blackwater employees unjustifiably opened 
fire in Baghdad and killed 17 civilians, seriously injuring 20 
more (Johnston and Broder 2007). Another notorious case 
is the participation in the 1990s of Dyncorp employees in a 
network trafficking young women (and girls as young as 12 
years old) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Payne 2002). 
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These incidents have revealed that in some cases 
recruiting procedures were problematic and resulted in 
nightclub bodyguards, for example, being hired by private 
companies (Spearin 2005, 249). Arguably, the operation 
of the global contract chain renders thorough vetting very 
difficult. As McCoy (2010, 680) explains, the assembling 
of a global workforce inhibits the effective investigation of 
the criminal background of every contractor. There is no 
such thing as a global database of criminal activity. And 
the domestic legislation of many states does not permit 
the release of the criminal records of their citizens to third 
parties. Yet, some PMSCs have gone so far to reduce the 
cost of their operations that they have endangered the 
success of their missions. For instance, an investigation of 
the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services 
(2010, xi) revealed that among ArmorGroup’s contractors 
in Afghanistan there were ‘warlords . . . engaged in murder, 
bribery, and anti-Coalition activities’. Interestingly, Doug 
Brooks, President of the International Stability Operations 
Association, wondered, ‘Where are they going to get guys 
who have never smoked hashish, who have never worked 
for the Taliban or who have never considered joining the 
Taliban?’ (Hodge 2010). Indeed, since November 2009 the 
US has demanded that all contracted PMSCs in Afghanistan 
should recruit at least 50% of their employees from the 
people residing within a 30-mile radius of the location 
requiring security (Pincus 2009). 
News reports have also disclosed that PMCs frequently 
provide inadequate training for their personnel. For instance, 
in Afghanistan it is reported that there are widespread 
‘failures to meet training standards’ among PMSCs with 
respect to the use of weapons, the law of armed conflict 
and the rules for the use of force (United States Senate 
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Committee on Armed Services 2010, vi). The emphasis 
of many PMSCs on ‘flexible, short-term contract labor’ 
means that they do not have much incentive to invest in 
the training of their employees (McCoy 2010, 681). It is no 
surprise, therefore, to hear that occasionally the labour force 
of PMSCs is deficient in preparation, cohesion, discipline or 
capabilities.
What is more disturbing is that, in the case of the 
vast majority of criminal acts that take place in third 
countries, the perpetrators are not prosecuted and justice 
is never rendered (Leander 2010, 468). This is for several 
reasons. First, on top of the fact that the national courts of 
contracting countries have no jurisdiction over the territory 
of other states, PMSC employees frequently enjoy a 
status of immunity in the areas in which they conduct their 
operations (Carbonnier 2006, 410). Further, private security 
service suppliers have demonstrated little eagerness to 
assist local authorities investigating charges of human 
rights violations against their employees. According to 
Singer (2003), this happens because private security 
contractors do not want to ‘scare off’ either their clients 
or prospective employees. The best-known example of 
a corporate cover-up is the way Dyncorp managed the 
revelations that some of its employees in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were involved in human trafficking. Not only 
did the company transfer the implicated contractors out 
of the country in order to protect them from prosecution 
by the local authorities, it also fired its employees who 
uncovered the evidence about these crimes (O’Meara 
2002, 48).
Many private companies also attempt to avoid being 
subject to the national jurisdiction of states that have 
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strict laws regulating their activity. As already explained, 
transnational PMSCs commonly form joint ventures with 
local subcontractors and do not get directly involved in the 
implementation of the contracts that have been granted 
to them. Some private companies transfer their registered 
offices offshore, selecting locations with the most favourable 
conditions for their operation (United States General 
Accounting Office 2010a). Other companies are formed 
for the implementation of specific contracts and are not 
interested in constructing an image that will help them bid 
for future contracts (Leander 2005a, 614). 
A good case in point is Blackwater Worldwide. Following 
the Nisour Square incident of September 2007 (in which 
17 civilians were killed), Blackwater created 31 subsidiary 
companies to obscure its identity and continue to bid 
for US contracts. Paravant, XPG and Greystone are all 
Blackwater affiliates that have won US State Department 
and CIA contracts (Risen and Mazzetti 2010b). In February 
2009, Blackwater even renamed itself ‘Xe’ and announced 
that it would shift its focus from protection services to 
training activities (Collins 2009). Many further accusations of 
improprieties, and new charges and criminal investigations 
against Blackwater/Xe forced its president, Erik Prince, to 
announce in June 2010 that he would put the company up 
for sale (Porter 2010). In the meantime, not only did the US 
award new contracts to Xe and its affiliates, it even settled 
with the company in an ‘administrative manner’ (i.e. by 
fining it rather than pressing criminal charges) several of 
the serious illegal activities of the latter (Risen 2010b). The 
disregard shown by the US for a series of criminal charges 
against Blackwater/Xe— for murder, violations of weapons 
law and bribery (Risen 2009, 2010a; Risen and Mazzetti 
2010a)—and its uninterrupted outsourcing of services to 
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the company has given the latter a ‘practical legitimacy’ 
and constitutes explicit acknowledgment of its status in the 
market (Leander 2010, 474). The company may occasionally 
receive a fine and some of its officers may eventually be 
convicted, but no accusation, no matter how serious, risks 
expelling the company from the market. Xe was eventually 
sold in December 2010 to USTC Holdings (Agence France-
Presse 2010), but Prince did not leave the business. In 
May 2011, he appeared in Abu Dhabi, working ‘to oversee 
the effort and recruit troops’ of Reflex Responses, a PMC 
that has been contracted to ‘conduct special operations 
missions inside and outside’ the United Arab Emirates 
(Mazzetti and Hager 2011).
Private companies have also sometimes breached the 
terms of their contracts with their employees and, in a few 
extreme cases, they have followed practices reminiscent 
of human traffickers such as the confiscation of their 
contractors’ travel documents (McCoy 2010, 681–5). In 
December 2008, it was revealed that a subcontracted 
company of KBR in Iraq kept about 100 contractors from 
India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh confined for three 
months in ‘windowless warehouses’. The company’s 
explanation is worth mentioning: it asserted that it had 
met some unexpected ‘obstacles’ with the services it was 
contracted to do and that it was in the meantime keeping its 
employees in a compound to protect them from the dangers 
of a war zone (Ashton 2008; McCoy 2010). 
The very volatile nature of the contemporary market for 
force does not seem to prevent PMCs from offering their 
services to non-recognised or illegal (e.g. secessionist or 
terrorist) organisations, thereby promoting international 
insecurity and instability, and by extension laying the 
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foundations for more demand for their services. Singer 
(2001/02, 213) uses the term ‘rogue firms’ to depict the 
companies that are ready to sign these type of contracts 
and refers to the case of Hod Hahanit, a PMC that trained 
Colombian paramilitaries who were later implicated in 
political assassinations and the bombing of a civilian 
plane. 
 
The frequent impunity of PMSCs and of their employees 
is largely due to the insufficient regulatory framework 
provided by international law (de Nevers 2009, 174). As 
Shearer (1998, 77) explains, ‘[t]he most accepted definition 
of a mercenary, found in Article 47 of the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, is so riddled with 
loopholes that few international-law scholars believe 
it could withstand the rigors of the courtroom.’ What 
is more, only 32 states have ratified or acceded to the 
‘International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries’ of 4 December 1989. 
The Convention entered into force on 21 October 2001. 
However, no major home country of private security service 
suppliers (e.g. France, the UK and the US), or country where 
contractors have been massively deployed (e.g. Afghanistan 
or Iraq) figures among the party states to the Convention.3 
In any case, as José L. Gómez del Prado (2010), a member 
of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, notes, 
employees of legally registered PMSCs who are contracted 
to work legally in third countries are not considered to be 
mercenaries under international law. Therefore, a possible 
increase in the number of states that accede to the 
Convention will not suffice on its own to remedy the legal 
vacuum in which the PMSCs operate. 
3  For the list of the countries that are party to the convention see ICRC (2005).
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The vast breadth of roles and activities that these 
companies perform further complicates the regulation 
at the international level of the private security service 
supplier sector. Contemporary international humanitarian 
law identifies only two categories of persons in conflicts: 
combatants and civilians/non-combatants. Hence, a whole 
range of actors operating in a grey zone between these two 
categories should necessarily fit into one of them (de Nevers 
2009, 171–2). The issue here is not only to ensure the 
accountability of the employees of PMSCs. As Carbonnier 
(2006, 409) warns, the blurring of the civilian/combatant 
distinction in the conduct of hostilities may ‘weaken in 
practice the protection to which civilians are entitled’. 
In Search of Norms and Regulations
In recent years, some interesting attempts have been 
made to codify international rules and articulate principles 
that more or less explicitly impinge upon the operation of 
PMSCs.  
The first initiative concerns the decision of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), within the framework 
of the elaboration of the ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, to stipulate 
that states should also be held responsible for unlawful 
undertakings of private agencies working on their behalf 
(UN General Assembly 2001, 2). The ILC adopted the Draft 
Articles in August 2001 and the UN General Assembly 
approved them shortly thereafter. While some countries 
have been supportive of the idea of negotiating a multilateral 
convention on state responsibility, others have expressed 
scepticism that such a process might imperil the fragile 
compromise reached in the Draft Articles’ final text 
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(Crawford and Olleson 2005, 959–71; UN General Assembly 
Sixth Committee 2010). Hence the UN General Assembly 
has not taken any decision on the final form of the Articles. 
The second initiative was undertaken by the UN Human 
Rights Council’s Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries. 
The latter presented a ‘Draft of a Possible Convention on 
Private Military and Security Companies’ in July 2010. It 
stipulates that states are responsible for the activities of 
PMSCs in their territory (article 4) and it suggests a list 
of functions that states ‘cannot outsource or delegate to 
PMSCs under any circumstances’ (UN Working Group 
2010, 25). Moreover, it urges that every state party to the 
treaty should ‘develop and adopt national legislation to 
adequately and effectively regulate the activities of PMSCs’ 
(article 12). The major home countries of PMSCs expressed 
their opposition to the Draft Convention, arguing that there 
was no need for such a binding document. The UN Human 
Rights Council (2010, 2) decided by a majority of votes 
to establish ‘an open-ended intergovernmental working 
group’ that would consider ‘the possibility of elaborating an 
international regulatory framework’. Optimists may argue 
that the way has opened for the elaboration of a legally 
binding treaty. However, even if such a treaty is concluded, 
it will be of limited utility if the states where the private 
security industry thrives do not adopt it (White 2011, 150).  
Another interesting initiative was launched in 2006 
by Switzerland in cooperation with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and was embraced by 17 
countries, including the US, the UK, Afghanistan and 
Iraq (i.e. the countries which are most closely linked to 
the private security industry). The consultations—which 
included representatives of civil society and private 
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security contractors—were concluded on 17 September 
2008 with the adoption of the Montreux Document. This 
document consists of two parts. Part one recalls the duties 
of PMSCs and of their personnel, as well as the ‘pertinent 
international legal obligations’ of states according 
to international law. Part two provides guidance and 
assistance to states by outlining a set of good practices for 
their relationship with PMSCs. Nonetheless, the Montreux 
Document (United Nations 2008, 3) unequivocally states 
that ‘[n]either parts are legally binding, nor are they 
intended to legitimize the use of PMSCs in any particular 
circumstance’. As a result, Gómez del Prado (2009, 445) 
depicts the document as ‘a promotional declaration of 
intentions’. He also remarks on the strong influence of 
the industry’s lobby as well as on the placement of most 
of the burden of responsibility on the states of operation. 
Similarly, Cockayne (2009, 427–8) warns of the danger 
‘that the Montreux Document will provide states with a 
fig-leaf to hide the absence of more rigorous efforts to 
regulate this industry’. The adoption of the Montreux 
Document has indeed provided justification for the US 
and many European countries to express opposition to 
the Draft Convention of the UN Working Group on the Use 
of Mercenaries. Hence, the Montreux Document and the 
Draft Convention run in parallel, attracting the support of 
different groups of states that diverge in terms of their 
perspectives on the regulation of PMSCs (White 2011, 
150). 
The fourth initiative aiming at regulating the sector 
of private security service suppliers has come from the 
industry itself. On 9 November 2010, 58 PMSCs asserted 
that they endorsed the Montreux Document and signed 
an ‘International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
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Service Providers’ (ICoC 2010, 3). In the following months, 
dozens of companies followed suit and signed the code 
(266 companies as of 1 December 2011 [ICOC 2011]). 
Interestingly, the signatory companies agreed to establish 
an external independent ‘governance and oversight 
mechanism’ that would certify compliance with the Code of 
Conduct and would audit and monitor their work in the field. 
However, the code underscores that it does not create any 
legal obligations for the signatory companies (ICoC 2010, 
4–6). In addition, nothing compels all PMSCs to accede to 
the code. Certification by the governance and oversight 
mechanism will certainly enhance the credibility of a private 
security service supplier. Yet lack of certification will not 
necessarily push a company out of the market if it offers 
adequate services at very competitive rates (Krahmann 
2005, 262). Therefore, the industry’s own code of conduct 
cannot provide a realistic alternative to the necessary 
regulation at both the national and international levels of the 
operation of PMSCs. 
Notwithstanding the individual merits of each of the 
above initiatives, the different philosophies underpinning 
these processes bring to the light the existence of 
substantial differences among states. At the risk of 
oversimplifying a complex picture, it might be argued that 
countries closely affiliated with the private security industry 
(i.e. contracting states and states of operation) have been 
reluctant to support the sector’s international regulation. 
Still, these states have so far been the main recipients of the 
negative consequences linked with the non-regulation of the 
market.  
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Concluding Remarks 
and Policy Recommendations
Contracting out the supply of military and security service 
is today a solidly growing trend worldwide. States and 
international organisations have emerged as the industry’s 
largest clients, seeking to outsource an increasing number 
(and type) of security services. Not surprisingly, the largest 
private companies have developed more advanced know-
how and greater material and human resources than 
the security agencies and armies of many states within 
the international system. The spectacular growth of the 
private security sector has caused a restructuring of 
public–private relations in the domain of security. It also 
raises questions about the preservation of the state’s 
claim to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical violence. According to Krahmann (2005, 255–7), 
the functional differentiation of security functions and 
the fragmentation of military resources and capabilities 
between public and private actors has transformed the 
PMSCs from service providers to partners of states in the 
definition and implementation of policies. This development 
is perceived to signify a broader shift from vertically 
centralised government to horizontally fragmented security 
governance. 
This study’s starting point was that the implications 
of outsourcing coercive force to private agencies are 
not a priori positive or negative. The relationship of state 
sovereignty to private power should not be perceived as a 
‘zero-sum game’ (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 238). Nor 
does the expansion of the private security sector necessarily 
represent a challenge to state power. The state system 
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indeed generated the enabling conditions for the growth of 
the private security industry. As a result, what is required 
is that states rapidly adapt to the new reality, to maximise 
the benefits and minimise the dangers of the opportunities 
offered by the availability in the market of private security 
services. In other words, states should concentrate on the 
‘when’ and ‘how’ concerning the contracting out of services 
in the domain of security.
• The uncontrolled commodification of security might in 
extremis raise serious questions even about the quality 
of a state’s democracy. States should determine their 
own inherently governmental functions and keep them 
out of the market’s reach. They should carefully avoid 
providing PMSCs with unrestricted access to information 
and procedures that lie beyond legislative scrutiny. In any 
case, states should entrench (and insulate from external 
interference) their capacity to select the most appropriate 
solutions to deal with their security needs. 
• Although security has been by and large transformed 
into a commodity, states ought to continue to handle it 
as a non-excludable good. An often-neglected aspect 
of the modern state’s ascendancy is the conclusion of a 
social contract with its people. The state has historically 
been vested with control of the means of coercion in its 
territory in exchange for its firm commitment to make 
every effort to protect the life and liberty of every one of 
its citizens. Having said that, states should stop reducing 
resources and operational objectives in response to the 
growth of the private security industry. States ought 
to keep striving to protect the security of their people, 
irrespective of the latter’s capacity to purchase this type 
of service in the market. 
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• A combination of publicly and privately supplied 
security services might be constructive under certain 
conditions. Where possible, states should favour policies 
for the prevention of threats as opposed to policies 
for the management of their impact, which usually fail 
to effectively protect all those in danger (Krahmann 
2008, 382–7). In this effort, states must not hesitate to 
develop synergies or partnerships with PSCs. Examples 
of public–private sector synergies such as those to 
reduce crime in the centre of Cape Town in South Africa, 
to protect diamond extraction in Sierra Leone and to 
guard oil drilling and transport facilities in Nigeria can 
be a paradigm for other similar forms of cooperation 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2007, 2009). 
• Many problems stemming from the outsourcing of 
security services are related to shortcomings in the 
operation of the private market for this type of service. 
Hence, states should ensure the smooth functioning of 
market mechanisms. First of all, supply should not be 
allowed to determine its own demand. It should not be 
possible that the same companies (or their affiliates) 
that take part in the collection, analysis and assessment 
of intelligence information on imminent threats then be 
tasked with the implementation of recommended security 
policies. In addition, states should always request 
competitive bids and strive to obtain more than one offer. 
Competition should be allowed to work. What is more, 
states should think twice about contracting out services 
to corporations that enjoy a monopoly in the market. 
Presumably, the implications of any disruption to the 
supply of security services will be very grave in cases 
where there are not several providers in the market and 
where states themselves no longer maintain a backup 
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capacity. Furthermore, states should avoid awarding 
cost-plus contracts for services when outsourcing is 
primarily intended to increase cost efficiency. More 
importantly, states should pay greater attention to the 
post-award management of their contracts. They should 
substantially improve the capacity (and the leeway for 
action) of their oversight institutions. The supervision of 
the implementation of private contracts should not be 
transferred to private agencies. Contract oversight might 
indeed be designated as an inherently governmental 
function. Apart from possibly giving rise to conflicts 
of interest, hiring private contractors to oversee other 
contractors is of questionable utility. This is because the 
work of the former would eventually have to be submitted 
to public oversight as well (Smith and Bauman 2011). 
In any case, the cost of vigorous contract management 
should be taken into account when a state considers the 
option of contracting out services. 
• Moreover, states should deal with the challenges that 
stem from the globalisation of the private security 
market. First, states should establish a regulatory 
framework for the activity and the operation of PMSCs 
at both the national and international levels. This is 
something that most PMSCs demand too in anticipation 
that their legitimacy will be entrenched (Brooks 2000, 
137). In addition, states should adjust their contracting 
practices to meet the requirements of the operation of a 
globalised multi-tier contract chain. They should explicitly 
stipulate in their agreements with prime contractors 
the responsibility of the latter for the activities of their 
subcontractors. Impunity should no longer be tolerated at 
either the corporate or individual level and misbehaving 
PMSCs should not be rewarded with new state 
contracts.  
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To conclude, states share the chief responsibility of 
shaping the development of the private security sector by 
establishing the necessary procedures, institutions and 
rules. The way states designate (or neglect to designate) 
public–private relations in the domain of security will 
eventually determine the role of PMSCs in global security 
governance.    
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Nikolaos Tzifakis
The global trend for contracting out the supply of military and security 
services is growing. Security is being transformed from a service 
for the public or common good into a privately provided service. 
The present paper by Nikolaos Tzifakis argues that the implications 
of outsourcing security services to private agencies are not a 
priori positive or negative; proper regulation of private military and 
security services is important. The author recommends that states 
should determine their ‘inherently governmental functions’ and keep 
these functions out of the market’s reach. States should attempt to 
mitigate some of the shortcomings in the operation of the private 
market for security services by preventing supply from determining 
its own demand. States need to avoid contracting out services to 
corporations that enjoy a monopoly in the market. Instead, they 
should open competitive bids for all private security contracts.
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